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*This is a paper I recently submitted for an Analytic Theology class I am currently taking, dealing with the “two-minds view” of the incarnation propounded by the philosophers Thomas Morris and Richard Swinburne. I hope you enjoy!*
A Double-Minded Christ? An Assessment of the “Two-Minds” View of the Hypostatic Union
The relation of the divine and human natures of Jesus Christ was the locus around which virtually all the Christian ecumenical councils of the first millennium of the Church rotated. The principal question has always been: how is the Eternal Son of God, the Second Divine Person of the Trinity, related to the human man Jesus – and in such a way as to make coherent the biblical narrative and what we know about the nature of divine being? The Reformed Scholastic theologian Francis Turretin describes one particular error–Nestorianism, named after its chief proponent–thus: “He [Nestorius] [believed]… that Christ was not God, but only a man possessed by God… Thus he made two Christs – one of whom was crucified by the Jews; the other… who was not” (1994, 318). The chief error, then, propounded by Nestorius, was the separation of the natures of Christ in such a way as to make what orthodox Christology sees as the one person of the Eternal Son, taken on flesh, as consisting of two persons: one human, one divine. Against this, the orthodox theologians of Chalcedon expounded a model of the hypostatic union that maintained the unity of the singular person whilst insisting that he exists in two different modes: one divine, one human.
Thomas V. Morris, in his book The Logic of God Incarnate, explicates what he calls the “two minds” understanding of the hypostatic union. Such a view, prima facie, seems to emphasize the distinction between the natures rather than their inseparable unity, and could lead some theologians to the conclusion that it bears a resemblance to Nestorian Christology. In fact, this is precisely what has been levelled against the position from theologians such as Eleonore Stump. Morris himself explicitly denies the charge of heresy, listing off and negating all the relevant ancient heresies that might be associated with his position (1986, 103). The question to be considered is: Does Morris’s “two-minds” view of the Incarnation avoid the heresy of Nestorianism?
First, I will explain the two-minds view and outline Morris’s conceptual groundwork. Then, I will consider the objections from Stump before offering my conclusion about its “orthodoxy-value” – i.e., if it avoids what the Christian Church has shown constitutes a heretical view of Christ.
Morris’s Two-Minds View
Morris sets the stage for his position by eschewing as contradictory what he calls the “reduplicative strategy” for defending the doctrine. This strategy consists of assigning what he considers opposing attributes to the same subject. The problem he mentions goes like this: “x as A is N and x as B is not N” (1986, 48). The problem, he ends up concluding, is that this strategy assigns N and not N to the same subject, which, whatever way you consider it, involves a contradiction (1986, 49). He then goes on to overcome this defensive strategy by reconceiving what counts as essential to human nature, and by reference to a firm distinction between “common properties” and “kind-essences” (1986, 72). Stump summarizes his eventual conclusion: “Morris argues that there is no reason for Christians to count as essential human properties any properties common to human beings which are incompatible with divine properties” (1989, 220). This then allows orthodox theologians to say that when human properties previously judged to be essential to humanity are shown to be incompatible with divine being, they should be assigned to the category of common properties (1986, 72). The solution? To claim that though Christ was fully human, he was not merely human.
This starting point leads to the need for the construal of the doctrine Morris proposes, what he calls the “two-minds view” of the incarnation. He says, “in the case of God Incarnate, we must recognize something like two distinct ranges of consciousness” (1986, 102). What does this mean? His primary analogy is that of two computer programs: one containing but not contained by the other (1986, 103). The earthly mind of Jesus can be completely open and accessible to the divine mind of the Logos, but the earthly mind of Jesus is only able to make the reverse move when the Logos allows it, and only in a limited capacity (1986, 103). The phrase Morris uses to capture this conceptual mechanism is “asymmetric accessing relation.” The divine and human minds have an asymmetric accessing relation to each other, asymmetric because of the superior and dominant access of the former over the latter. Oliver Crisp aptly describes the relation: “In short, the divine mind contains, but is not contained by, Christ’s human mind” (2009, 158).
He also appeals to psychology to make the point that it is possible for a singular person to “have different levels or ranges of mentality” (1986, 105). He recognizes that in some cases of multiple personality, there exists an analogous relation to the two-minds view of one dominant overarching personality having full and complete interior access to the subordinate or lesser personality, i.e., as constituted by an asymmetric accessing relation (1986, 106). Such a view, Morris is convinced, helps theologians and philosophers to see that “there seems to be no obstacle in principle to the acceptability of the widespread Christian assumption that it is possible that it is rational to believe Jesus to be God Incarnate” (1986, 204). The two minds view is meant as a philosophical defense of the incarnation and helps us see it as rationally coherent.
Nestorianism, Updated?
Ascriptions of Nestorianism to Morris’s position come from a variety of directions, only one of which we will deal with here. It is good to note that Morris himself was fully aware of the danger and addressed it (1986, 154-162). We will now consider the charges of Nestorianism labelled against his account from Eleonore Stump, before finally considering if the charge genuinely applies in Morris’s case.
Stump suggests that Morris’s model necessarily leads to a Nestorian Christology. She writes, “The account Morris gives of the two natures of Christ will seem to some theologians to eviscerate the Chalcedonian doctrine” (1989, 220). What I will now argue, however, is that each of her critiques amounts to a surface level ascription of a bifurcated subject which equally applies to other orthodox teachings on the meaning of the doctrine. Morris says, related to this, that it is no more difficult to deal with the question of two minds in Christ than it is to deal with two natures in Christ (1986, 162). If you have a problem with two minds in Christ, it is likely you also have problems with two natures in Him, too.
Stump’s critiques of the two-minds model is cutting, to be sure, but none of her critiques amount to a genuine demonstration of a Nestorian Christology. Stump’s questions, “How can there be one person who has two minds? Where there are two minds, won’t there be two persons?” (1989, 221) is surely concerning. Yet, Morris answers such questions roundly. The problem is resolved in his treatment of Aquinas, who demonstrates that not every instantiation of a nature is said to roundly explain the whole reality of which it is a part (1986, 156-157). Morris writes, “Among mere humans, the individuation of two minds at any one time will suffice for the identification of two persons. But this leaves open the possibility that outside that context, there is no such one-one correlation” (1986, 157). The reality of Christ is such an exception; to Morris, when the conjoining of body and soul includes some other mind or reality of which it is part, then those two elements are not enough to individuate a person, per Aquinas’s logic (1986, 157). It is only as within the divine mind – or included in the larger computer program, to use Morris’s metaphor – that the humanity of Jesus – the inferior program – can find its reality. Stump is unimpressed with Morris’s use of Aquinas because the latter relies on “medieval metaphysics about substances” (1989, 221), which she finds unacceptable. A cursory reading of his treatment of Aquinas (1986, 154-158), however, shows that Morris’s utilization of Aquinas does not constitute some break with the metaphysical makeup of the project as a whole. Here Stump appears to commit the genetic fallacy to dismiss the soundness of Morris’s argumentation.
Stump’s other critique is similar. She asks, “How are the two minds of Christ welded together into one person?” (1989, 221). The same question could be asked of the natures, and the same answer can be given: It is the person that secures the unity of the natures and therefore minds. In Christ there are two natures – with two minds and two wills – existing in a singular person: “For Jesus was the same person as God the Son. Thus, the personal cognitive and causal powers operative in the case of Jesus’ earthly mind were just none other than the cognitive and causal powers of God the Son” (1986, 162). In other words, the human mind of Christ is hypostatically united to the divine mind in a way not shared by other human minds (2009, 158). The same problem with the ascription of two minds to Christ could equally apply to the ascription of two natures to Christ, something Stump herself realizes though is not convinced by (1989, 221).
These questions answered, Morris adequately presents a model of the incarnation that avoids Nestorianism. Correctly understood, Morris’s position may be seen as a fuller elucidation of the thought that the two natures are complete and total considered in themselves, yet really and truly united in the person of Jesus. If the view is taken in the way Morris defines, as positing two analogous modalities in the one person of Christ, then the two-minds view of the hypostatic union is perfectly orthodox. That is, if and only if a mind is not constitutive of the person and the divine Son’s “ownership” of the human mind of Jesus is to be acceptable as a conceptual explanation, then Morris avoids charges of Nestorianism, even if on other counts – like on the charge of Monothelitism – it fails (1990, 146).
Conclusion
Morris’s two-minds view of Christ claims that in the person of Jesus there exists two minds, the divine mind of which exists in an asymmetric accessing relation to the human mind. He proposes his view because he finds the traditional Christian strategy of defending the incarnation inadequate, philosophically speaking. His critic, Eleonore Stump, charges him with a Nestorian final picture, which he denies applies to the model he outlines. Stump asks how two minds can exist in one person, and how a singular person can be welded together from two minds. Morris effectively and preemptively provides answers to each question by appeal to Aquinas to show how instantiations of human nature need not constitute personhood in the case of Christ, since though Christ was fully man he was not merely man; and by simple declaration that in the same way two natures exist because of the unity of the person, so do two minds.
The primary concern over Nestorianism with relation to the two-minds view of Christ has to do with how to understand the relationship between mind and person. His reliance upon medieval metaphysics is beside the point. Morris does an excellent job avoiding a bifurcated Christological subject and securing a model of the incarnation which makes possible the God-Man whom Christians meet in the scriptures and who is put forward by the orthodox Christian tradition. Though Morris’s model may not escape other criticisms – related to his thoughts on the essence of humanity, his assumption that divine and human properties could be incompatible, and his Monothelite descriptions – his work deserves special commendation. A fitting quote from Morris aptly terminates this study: “There is one person with two natures and two ranges of consciousness. He is not the theological equivalent of a centaur, half God and half man. He is fully human, but not merely human. He is also fully divine” (1986, 204).
Works Cited
Crisp, Oliver. (2009) God Incarnate: Explorations in Christology. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.
Flannery, Kevin L. (1990) “A Critical Note on Thomas Morris’s The Logic of God Incarnate,” in Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 54(1), pp. 141-149.
Morris, Thomas V. (1986) The Logic of God Incarnate. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Stump, Eleonore. (1989) “Thomas V. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate,” in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers 6(2), pp. 218-223.
Turretin, Francis. (1994) Institutes of Elenctic Theology: Volume 2, Eleventh Through Seventeenth Topics. Philipsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing.
Soli Deo Gloria
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